Foreign policy will be a crucial for the interim government. The immediate challenge will be to ensure stable ties with neighboring India. From sharing “deep-rooted bonds of history, language, culture, a multitude of other commonalities” to India’s vital historical role in Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan in 1971, the two countries have come a long way. Under Hasina’s leadership, the relationship between India and Bangladesh became stronger. However, when the military or the BNP and its allies were in power, suspicion arose in India and the country was accused of openly supporting Hasina and the Awami League. Today, this perception that Delhi’s influence is linked primarily to the Awami League may play a spoiler in normalizing bilateral ties.
In the immediate aftermath of August 5, Yunus conveyed his displeasure with India’s position on the protests and emphasized that it is an internal matter for Bangladesh. But India has been put on the spot by providing a safe haven to Hasina after her resignation. Political groups such as the BNP are asking India to return Hasina. In a press statement, a joint secretary general of the BNP added, “We want to maintain a good relationship with the people of India. Please arrest Sheikh Hasina and Sheikh Rehana, who fled the country, and send them back to Bangladesh. Sheikh Hasina has killed many people in Bangladesh.” The BNP cited the 2013 India-Bangladesh Extradition Extradition Treaty as requiring her return for cases filed against the former prime minister in Bangladesh, including murder cases, which qualify under Article 2(a) of the treaty.
However, Article 8 of the treaty provides immunity against extradition if a person “satisfies the Requested State that it would, having regard to all the circumstances, be unjust or oppressive to extradite him by reasons of…the accusation not having or been made in good faith in the interests of justice.” India is unlikely to extradite Hasina to Bangladesh, especially considering her long-standing close relationship with India, which was a significant ally during her time in power.
India must walk a tightrope to better its ties with Bangladesh’s new leaders. The interim government already has a strong anti-India voice in Hifazat-e-Islam, which is known to have supported the “India-out” campaign earlier this year. Even if Yunus makes a concerted effort to use his personal experience with India’s top leadership to improve bilateral ties, the chances of his advisers sabotaging the relationship are even greater, primarily because of Delhi’s alleged support for the Hasina regime.
According to Bangladesh watchers in India, Delhi has taken a massive risk by hosting Hasina, especially when the tides have turned against her in Bangladesh and the friendly Awami League is facing an existential crisis. In a suo motu statement on Bangladesh in the Indian parliament on August 6, Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar apprised legislators of the situation in Bangladesh.
India’s concerns center on the safety of minorities, particularly Hindus, who are reportedly being targeted by the BNP and Jamaat cadre. Support for Hindus in Bangladesh is a concern for India’s majority Hindu electorate and for the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party. However, Islamic fundamentalist forces in Bangladesh may continue to target Hindus to hurt India. They may view Hindus as symbolic of India’s influence in the region due to the historical and cultural connections between the two nations. Also, India’s advocacy for the protection of minorities in Bangladesh has been perceived by these extremists as external meddling, further incentivizing them to retaliate by targeting Hindus as a means to challenge India directly.
India shares a long border with Bangladesh, which nonstate actors have historically used for “illicit drug trafficking, fake currency, human trafficking” and terror activities. A 2018 report by the International Crisis Group highlighted concerns about the activities of terror groups in Bangladesh during the BNP’s Zia-led coalition government (2001–2006). According to the report, these groups, which had links to several international terror organizations, reportedly used Bangladesh as a safe haven. They were allegedly involved in attacks against foreign nations and carried out attacks in India. The presence and activities of these groups raised significant security concerns for India. Hasina was undoubtedly a strong partner with Delhi in counterterrorism efforts, particularly against extremist Islamic groups.
Fearing that Islamic extremists might reemerge following Hasina’s exit, India has taken steps to heighten security along its border with Bangladesh. This includes alerting and possibly reinforcing border forces to prevent any spillover of extremist activities and ensure border security. Foreign Minister Jaishankar has alerted border forces “to be exceptionally alert in view of this complex situation.” But India could face the same situation it faced 50 years ago – the influx of millions of Bangladeshi Hindus fleeing to the bordering regions of West Bengal and Tripura, fearing prosecution. The arrival of significant numbers of refugees would create a significant challenge for India to manage.
Amid mounting concerns, Prime Minister Modi congratulated Yunus “on assuming his new responsibilities.” He added, “We hope for an early return to normalcy, ensuring the safety and protection of Hindus and all other minority communities … [and] India remains committed to working with Bangladesh to fulfill the shared aspirations of both our peoples for peace, security and development.” On August 16, Modi spoke to Yunus by telephone and reiterated his call for the safety of the “Hindus and all other minority communities” in Bangladesh.
The good news is that India accepts the new political situation in Bangladesh. Even if nothing but permanent interests dominate bilateral or multilateral engagements, India would not wish to lose a huge neighboring market. Bangladesh is India’s biggest trade partner in South Asia, while India is Bangladesh’s second-largest trading partner (second to China). But it will be crucial for India to ensure that its advocacy for minorities in Bangladesh is taken in good faith, considering the BNP and Jamaat may exploit this stance to fuel anti-India sentiment or to gain political leverage by portraying India as interfering in Bangladesh’s internal affairs.
India the largest destination for Bangladesh exports, amounting to $2 billion in fiscal year 2022–2023, while bilateral trade stood at $15.9 billion. Interestingly, India-Bangladesh trade ties, unlike those with other South Asian countries, are not one way, making dependence a factor in the relationship. Apart from trade, connectivity, investments, and energy are vital pillars of cooperation between the two countries. While the current situation in Bangladesh might impact trade through rising security protocols on the border and disruptions in production, it will be interesting to see how eager India is to continue the momentum, even as it hosts Hasina.
China has also responded to developments in Bangladesh. In a statement on August 6, the Chinese Foreign Ministry noted that “China is following closely the developments in Bangladesh. As a friendly neighbour and comprehensive strategic cooperative partner of Bangladesh, China sincerely hopes that social stability will be restored soon.” China is unlikely to express anything beyond these formal lines. Certainly, China saw Bangladesh draw closer to India under Hasina – but that does not mean Beijing’s relations with Dhaka did not grow during the same period. Hasina managed a balanced outlook in which trade and investments took primacy. Bangladesh was among the first countries in India’s neighborhood to join the Belt and Road Initiative in 2016.
Bangladesh’s trade trajectory with China has been transformed in the last decade. When Hasina entered office in 2009, bilateral trade accounted for $3.3 billion; by her third term in office, it reached more than $20 billion in 2022. Chinese investment in Bangladesh exceeds $38 billion. In recent years, defense cooperation has become a vital pillar of bilateral ties, with China becoming Bangladesh’s primary supplier of light weapons. It also assisted Bangladesh with $1.2 billion for the first submarine dry base in its Cox’s Bazar region. The transformation in the bilateral relationship is significant, considering that China opposed the creation of an independent Bangladesh and supported Pakistan in 1971.
For China, Bangladesh’s critical location in the Bay of Bengal is the primary factor in this transformation. As the great powers have fought Chinese expansionism in the Indo-Pacific region, Beijing has attempted to deepen ties with regional players that cannot afford to choose sides, whether with the West, China, India, or Japan. At the same time, as Bangladesh has sought investments across geographies and political systems, it has looked to deepen its ties with China despite mounting pressure from Delhi.
With its foreign policy based on “cooperation with all and malice to none,” Bangladesh has achieved a good balance with neighbors and partners. For example, in 2023, it drafted its own “Indo-Pacific Outlook” instead of joining the vision of the United States and its allies in the region. Bangladesh’s outlook focused exploring economic opportunities, safeguarding sea lanes of communication, and maintaining peace and stability in the region – but did not refer at all to China.
For many observers in India and the West, China may be the biggest beneficiary of Bangladesh’s current political challenges. Given China’s track record of leveraging political instability to its advantage, the situation could open the door for Beijing to assert its economic and strategic influence in the country and the region. Considering that the new regime in Bangladesh may have to take an anti-India stance because of Delhi’s long-standing support for Hasina and its resentment of Islamic fundamentalist parties, there is no better choice than China since it is the mightiest regional power and presents a plethora of economic opportunities.
China comes with little historical baggage, despite having supported Pakistan in the 1971 war, and it has no problem interacting across party lines, whether extremist Islamic or secular. This contrasts with India’s consistent choice to engage secular forces to support the Hindu minority in maintaining its cultural and religious identity in a diverse and pluralistic society.
However, China could also opt for a wait-and-see strategy while it ensures its investments in Bangladesh are safe. Currently, nearly 1,000 Chinese companies are involved in infrastructure projects in Bangladesh, including energy, roads, and bridges. Soon after Hasina’s resignation, the Global Times, a Chinese state media outlet, reported that “Chinese businesses have rolled out contingency measures, including asking employees not to go out unless necessary, stockpile daily necessities, and temporarily suspend projects, amid weeks of protests in Bangladesh.”
Chinese investments in Bangladesh carry immediate risks, requiring swift guarantees from the interim government for their functioning and safety. Beijing’s political commitment to the new political regime may invite targeted attacks on Chinese investments from the ousted Awami League. China’s risk aversion suggests that it hopes political stability will prevail. Meanwhile, the Chinese envoy to Bangladesh met the BNP delegation on August 21, reiterating China’s support for Bangladesh. The envoy in his meeting with BNP stakeholders sought their commitment to the “one-China principle” and safeguarding China’s interests, including investments.
Following his meetings with the BNP delegation, Ambassador Yao Wen also met with the Yunus on August 25, conveying “No matter what changes have taken place in the domestic situation of Bangladesh, China’s commitment to develop China-Bangladesh relations remains unchanged.” On September 2, Wen held talks with the Jamaat leaders at their office, which was reopened the very next day of Hasina’s exit. In his remarks to the media in the presence of Jamaat leaders, Yao told that “Jamaat-e-Islami is a disciplined party. The people of China want friendly relations with the people of Bangladesh. We will continue to work for the development, progress and prosperity of Bangladesh in the future.” The chronology of these meeting clearly exhibits Beijing’s strategy of engaging with potential actors who may make a comeback in the next government. These moves suggest that China is betting on the opposition’s return to power, especially since the Awami League has gone underground following Hasina’s exit.
Navigating diplomatic relations beyond India and China, the interim government in Bangladesh faces significant hurdles in engaging with the United States. Washington was a strong critic of Bangladesh’s political landscape under Hasina, pointing to anti-democratic tendencies, authoritarianism, and human rights concerns. If the interim government continues with the same tendencies—such as conducting unfair elections or allowing the military to play a significant role in civilian administration—it is likely that the U.S. will maintain its critical stance. The challenges in U.S.-Bangladesh relations, therefore, rise not just from specific leadership but from structural issues that undermine democratic governance and human rights, regardless of who is in power.
The U.S. position on democratic developments has been constant since the 2018 elections in Bangladesh. The U.S. State Department raised concerns about electoral irregularities that “prevented some people from voting, which undermined faith in the electoral process.” The United States took a similar position on the 2024 elections, “concerned by the arrests of thousands of political opposition members and by reports of irregularities on elections day… [and] these elections were not free or fair and we regret that not all parties participated.”
Despite recent criticisms of Bangladesh’s elections and democracy, the White House seems to have softened its approach to engaging with the country, as it remains a crucial partner in the Indo-Pacific. In a rare event, President Joe Biden penned a letter to Hasina on February 6 – just after she began her fourth term – conveying the “sincere” desire of his “administration to continue our work together on regional and global security, economic development, climate change and energy, global health, humanitarian support, especially for Rohingya refugees, and more.” Biden assured Hasina of the U.S. commitment to supporting “Bangladesh’s ambitious economic goals and partnering with Bangladesh on our shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific.”
Logically, the United States was right to reset the tone of the relationship and seek to engage rather than letting anti-American sentiment grow in Bangladesh. Following President Biden’s letter to Prime Minister Hasina, Donald Lu, assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian Affairs, visited Dhaka in May 2024 on his tour of the subcontinent. Lu’s visit aligned with Biden’s letter, pointing out that the United States and Bangladesh share a vision of an “Indo-Pacific region that is free and open, connected, prosperous, secure and resilient” and rebuilding ties. However, Lu’s visit to Bangladesh was marred by controversies and criticized by Awami League leaders.
In a press briefing, the Awami League’s general secretary added, “We didn’t invite him[;] rather he has come to this country because of their different needs.” This statement may have been a reaction to Lu’s emphasis on Bangladesh’s human rights record. In a follow-up to Lu’s visit, the United States introduced a new visa policy for Bangladesh under Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which restricts the “issuance of visas for any Bangladeshi individual, believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, undermining the democratic election process in Bangladesh.” Having criticized the Awami League in the past on such grounds, the new visa policy certainly marked a new low in bilateral ties.
Despite the negativity of these statements, the Hasina government made great strides with the United States in trade, investment, and security. The United States has been a major trade partner of Bangladesh, with trade accounting for $13,243 million in 2021–2022 and U.S. direct investment in Bangladesh estimated at $695 million in 2022. On the security cooperation front, since 2014, the United States has allocated $78.45 million in foreign military financing, with $54.8 million earmarked for bilateral programs and $23.6 million for the Bay of Bengal Initiative. The Bangladesh Navy has been a part of the U.S. Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training program since 2010; this weeklong program is aimed at enhancing “collaboration focused ion shared maritime security challenges in the region.”
Yunus has been dismissive of U.S. pressure. In an interview with local media in Bangladesh in June 2024, Yunus stated bluntly, “I don’t care what the West wants. What matters is whether we want democracy, human rights and freedom of the press. If they want what we want, it is a matter of happiness. If they don’t want it, we will continue to want it. Why let it be imposed on us like them?” He added, “It doesn’t matter when or what they said. Each country will formulate its foreign policy according to its own rules.”
Despite Yunus’s past remarks about the United States, he is favored by the Democratic Party, as reflected in a January 22 letter from 12 U.S. senators urging Hasina to “end the persistent harassment of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Professor Muhammad Yunus – and the pattern of abusing laws and the justice system to target critics of the government more broadly.” As a leader with a better global image, Yunus will face the significant task of resetting ties with the United States and addressing contentious human rights issues.
Meanwhile, the United States is alleged to have had a role in toppling Hasina’s government. An unconfirmed statement by Hasina has circulated in the Indian media claiming that the United States orchestrated her removal because she refused to surrender the sovereignty of Saint Martin Island, located in the northeastern Bay of Bengal. The tiny island has strategic importance because of its proximity to major shipping lanes and potential offshore resources, making it a point of interest for the United States’ regional security and economic influence. Had the United States made such a demand, it would have gone too far in pushing Dhaka.
Indeed, like every great power, the United States seeks to increase its outreach in the Indo-Pacific, but not when the cost is too high – such as toppling an elected government. Difference makes partnerships grow and improve, but baseless accusations are outlandish. The State Department has firmly refuted such claims, calling them “laughable … any implication that the United States was involved in Sheikh Hasina’s resignation is absolutely false. We have seen a lot of disinformation in recent weeks, and we remain incredibly committed to strengthening information integrity across the digital ecosystem, especially with our partners in South Asia.” Considering that the two countries have spent decades developing multisector cooperation, especially with respect to tackling terrorism, staging something of this sort would be a serious political blunder on the United States’ part.
Where does the Islamic world stand on the unfolding situation in Bangladesh – an Islamic nation?
Bangladesh has had a love-hate relationship with the Islamic world, especially the Awami League’s version of Islam, which is primarily secular and culturally rich. It is noteworthy that no country in the Islamic world, including Saudi Arabia – a vital member of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) – supported Pakistan during the 1971 Liberation War. There was a widespread belief among Islamic countries that the war was India’s strategy to split Pakistan in two and create the separate nation of Bangladesh.
Bangladesh became a member of the OIC in 1974, marking the beginning of a fresh partnership with the Islamic world. That relationship has evolved in trade, investment, and cultural and religious exchanges over the last five decades. Bangladesh also receives significant remittances from expatriate workers in the Middle East, which plays a crucial role in its economy. Bangladesh collaborates with other Islamic countries on a variety of issues, including trade, education, and humanitarian efforts, demonstrating a united front in addressing global challenges facing the Muslim world, including solidarity in supporting Palestine.
Despite this strong working relationship, no major statement has come from the countries of the Islamic world (as of August 10) except for Pakistan and Malaysia; Islamabad expressed hope for a “peaceful and swift return to normalcy,” while Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim welcomed the new government on behalf of Kuala Lumpur, with sly appreciation for the student-led movement against the Hasina government, adding “As a new dawn rises over Bangladesh, bringing forth a renewal driven by the vigour and vision of its youth…at this pivotal moment in history, I wish the people of Bangladesh every success and the brightest of futures.”
Meanwhile, at this pressing moment, the question is whether Hasina will find support or asylum in any Islamic country. Reports suggest that amid immigration-related chaos in the United Kingdom, the chances of her application getting attention in London may be slim. Therefore, she may think of several Islamic countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which have historically provided refuge to exiled leaders because of their religious and political affiliations. However, where she eventually settles remains to be seen.
Every year we witness the inspiring journey of several disorders – advocate and raise awareness of various inspiring individuals and have visualized the incredible talent of the visually impaired, autistic speakers and models, down syndrome entrepreneurs, Asperger’s – epilepsy disorders, cerebral palsy role models, our special amputees, dyspraxia, dementia and this year we advocated Schizophrenia and Bipolar. The Gala serves as a unique platform where sponsors, donors and supporters get the opportunity to meet inspiring Differently-abled Speakers, Entrepreneurs, employers, performers and beneficiaries they will be supporting and see for themselves the beautiful talents these individuals bring to the world.
Srinivasan, Sheetal and Jasmin Pathak, Dr. Harshil Parekh, Akash Patel as well as Founders Paresh and Flora Parekh Welcomed and Thanked Several organizational Presidents, Community Leaders, Sponsors, Supporters well-wishers for their continued support year over year. Directors Mayur Dalal and Amarish Kachhy shared their remote wishes and blessings. Kaul Photography covered great event memories.
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