Brazil has decided not to participate in China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), marking a second such decision within the BRICS bloc following India’s stance. Instead, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s government aims to build strategic economic relations with China through different channels, avoiding a formal agreement under the BRI. Celso Amorim, Brazil’s special presidential adviser on international affairs, confirmed on Monday that Brazil seeks collaboration with Chinese investors without officially joining the multi-billion-dollar initiative.
Amorim emphasized Brazil’s intent to advance its relationship with China independently. “We are not entering into a treaty,” he stated in an interview with the Brazilian newspaper *O Globo*. Brazil intends to utilize parts of the BRI framework to foster synergy between its own infrastructure projects and available Chinese investment funds but will not sign an accession contract. The objective is to selectively pursue projects of priority to Brazil, which China might be willing to support, without committing to the entire initiative, according to Amorim. “They call it the belt [and road], and they can give whatever names they want,” he said, emphasizing that the priority for Brazil is its agenda, not the BRI’s formal designation.
China had reportedly anticipated Brazil’s participation in the BRI as a highlight of President Xi Jinping’s upcoming visit to Brasilia on November 20. However, internal discussions in Brazil’s economy and foreign affairs ministries led to the decision to forgo BRI membership. Recent opinions among officials reflected concerns that joining the Chinese-led infrastructure project may not yield significant immediate benefits for Brazil and could complicate relations with the United States, especially if former President Donald Trump returns to office. Amorim, accompanied by the president’s chief of staff Rui Costa, traveled to Beijing last week to discuss the BRI proposals, but the team returned to Brazil “unconvinced and unimpressed” by the offerings from China, according to sources.
Amorim’s cautious stance aligns with Brazil’s broader foreign policy approach under Lula’s leadership. Brazil, as a BRICS member, has been historically inclined towards promoting multipolar international relations. However, the country appears unwilling to engage in binding agreements that might influence its economic and political landscape long-term, especially as China seeks to expand its influence in Latin America.
The decision follows a precedent set by India, which has consistently opposed the BRI. India’s objections to China’s flagship infrastructure project stem primarily from the BRI’s strategic China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a $60 billion investment project passing through Pakistan-administered Kashmir, a region India claims as part of its sovereign territory. India argues that the BRI should adhere to internationally recognized norms, including transparency, financial sustainability, and good governance. India’s diplomats have voiced opposition to the BRI at high-profile meetings within the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), reinforcing their stance on respecting sovereignty.
India has also raised concerns about the economic viability of BRI projects, particularly in smaller, financially vulnerable countries. The leasing of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port to China for 99 years following a debt restructuring deal has been criticized as a “debt trap,” sparking a financial crisis in Sri Lanka and fueling concerns about similar outcomes in other developing countries engaged with the BRI. Brazil’s recent deliberations appear to have taken note of such examples, weighing the risks of potential long-term dependencies on China.
The United States has also raised cautionary notes about Brazil’s potential engagement with the BRI. U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai recently urged Brazil to critically assess the BRI proposal, recommending an “objective lens” and “risk management” approach. In response, the Chinese embassy in Brasilia labeled Tai’s remarks as “irresponsible” and “disrespectful,” asserting that Brazil has the sovereign right to form partnerships as it sees fit. Furthermore, China’s state-run Global Times editorialized Tai’s remarks as an example of the “Monroe Doctrine,” suggesting that the United States seeks to limit Latin America’s engagement with China, echoing a historical stance of exerting influence over the region.
The Global Times went on to criticize Washington’s involvement in Brazil’s decision-making process, asserting that the U.S. is creating a “small yard, high fence” strategy to limit China’s influence in Latin America. The editorial argued that China’s economic cooperation with Brazil aligns with the interests of both nations and contributes to a “more just and equitable international economic order” for the Global South. According to the Chinese publication, U.S. efforts to curb China-Brazil ties reflect a strategic push to hinder Beijing’s growing influence in Latin America.
This move by Brazil signals a significant shift in the geopolitical dynamics of the BRICS bloc, which initially consisted of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, with new members like Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates joining recently. Although some of these countries have shown interest in the BRI, Brazil’s resistance, along with India’s, suggests a divergence within BRICS over China’s approach to expanding its global influence. This decision also mirrors Brazil’s nuanced approach to international partnerships under President Lula, who is pursuing multipolarity without binding the country’s economic policies to any single global power.
In light of these recent developments, Brazilian officials have voiced caution about overly relying on China for infrastructure projects, with many expressing concerns that such dependence could lead to economic challenges similar to those faced by smaller BRI-engaged nations. Brazil’s approach seeks to safeguard its autonomy while selectively benefiting from China’s investment opportunities on mutually agreeable terms.
Brazilian President Lula, who was unable to attend the recent BRICS summit in Kazan due to an injury, holds a pragmatic view on foreign relations that has shaped this decision. Additionally, his close ally, former President Dilma Rousseff, currently heads the Shanghai-based BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), an institution designed to support infrastructure and sustainable development projects across BRICS nations. While the NDB offers Brazil another platform for securing investment and advancing its development goals, the choice to refrain from formal BRI membership underscores Brazil’s prioritization of bilateral initiatives that align with its national objectives.
As China continues to expand its BRI network, resistance from prominent emerging economies like Brazil and India signals potential challenges for the initiative. Brazil’s decision represents a cautious approach that allows the country to collaborate with China in line with its unique national priorities, avoiding over-reliance on any single framework.
