Confidential report reveals widespread public anger in Iran, with a significant majority supporting regime change or deep reforms amid rising discontent over economic hardships and government corruption.
A confidential report prepared for Iran’s presidency has raised critical questions regarding the Islamic Republic’s vulnerability to regime change. The document, titled “What Iran Wants,” indicates that extraordinary levels of public anger and calls for systemic change may warrant a reassessment by Washington and its allies.
According to the report, only 9% of respondents supported maintaining the status quo, while 53% advocated for fundamental or structural reforms. Additionally, more than 19% favored a complete overhaul of the political system. Collectively, nearly three-quarters of those surveyed expressed support for either deep reforms or a replacement of the existing regime, suggesting that Iran’s political crisis extends beyond mere dissatisfaction with individual leaders or policies.
IranWire reported on July 13 that it had obtained the document, which was compiled by Ali Rabiei, a social adviser to President Masoud Pezeshkian and a former government spokesman. The polling was conducted by the Ara Opinion Research Center in May 2026 and circulated among various institutions within Iran’s governing structure in June.
Miad Maleki, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, emphasized that the report should prompt a fresh evaluation of the potential for political upheaval in Iran. “If anything, this research understates the depth of Iranians’ rage,” Maleki stated. “Even a survey prepared for the regime’s own president, by its own pollsters, records anger levels above 63%, which is well beyond the highest rate Gallup has ever recorded anywhere in the world.” He noted that 81% of respondents reported struggling to secure enough food, and a majority expressed feelings of hopelessness.
Maleki also cautioned that polling conducted under an authoritarian regime may not accurately reflect public sentiment, as respondents could fear repercussions for expressing dissent. “In a police state where expressing the wrong opinion can cost you your job, your freedom, or your life, respondents self-censor,” he explained. “Thus, these findings are best read as a floor, not a ceiling.”
The complete methodology of the survey was not disclosed in the material obtained by IranWire, leaving questions about how respondents were selected and whether the sample accurately represents Iran’s diverse population. Consequently, the findings cannot be independently verified or treated as definitive measures of Iranian public opinion. Furthermore, the report does not establish that dissatisfaction will necessarily lead to an organized movement capable of ousting the government.
Despite these limitations, the report highlights several converging pressures. Approximately 64% of respondents reported persistent anger, an increase of roughly 12 percentage points from a previous government survey conducted in December 2025. Half of those surveyed expressed feelings of hopelessness, while about 48% reported sadness or depression, and nearly 45% indicated persistent fear or anxiety.
Economic distress appears to be a central factor fueling public anger. More than 81% of respondents experienced severe or partial difficulty obtaining sufficient food, and 75% struggled to cover medical expenses. Additionally, 54% indicated that their income did not meet current household expenses, with only 8% reporting earnings sufficient for savings.
Interestingly, respondents attributed their economic woes more to domestic governance than to external pressures. Nearly 47% cited government inefficiency as the primary cause of Iran’s economic challenges, while 26% blamed corruption and 21% pointed to foreign sanctions.
This finding could significantly impact the debate surrounding regime change, as it suggests that many Iranians do not primarily hold outside powers responsible for their deteriorating living conditions. The report also reveals a crisis of institutional confidence, with roughly 60% of respondents expressing distrust in major government institutions. Additionally, 61.2% negatively assessed officials’ abilities to address Iran’s pressing issues, with distrust levels for the government, parliament, judiciary, and state television remaining above 50%.
Despite the alarming findings, the report’s recommendations reportedly focused on managing public dissatisfaction rather than addressing demands for systemic change. Rabiei urged state institutions to better communicate the impact of sanctions, moderate official rhetoric, present a more inclusive image through state media, and avoid policies that place the government in direct opposition to society.
IranWire’s subsequent analysis argued that the recommendations treated Iran’s crisis primarily as a communications and public perception issue, offering few concrete proposals for institutional accountability, political liberalization, or fundamental economic reform.
Maleki noted that the findings align with the increasing scale of unrest in Iran, citing demonstrations that have expanded from over 80 cities in 2017 to more than 200 cities across all 31 provinces this year, alongside a quadrupling of strikes. “Iranians have moved from being skeptical of what another revolution might bring to concluding there is no alternative to one, because reform has proven impossible,” he said.
However, the report does not address one of the most significant obstacles to regime change: the Islamic Republic’s long-standing institutions designed to monitor, deter, and violently suppress organized opposition. “This regime was born of revolution, by revolutionaries,” Maleki stated. “Preventing and crushing the next one is the one thing they genuinely know how to do.”
Nevertheless, he argued that further unrest is inevitable. “So the discontent will translate into renewed protest,” Maleki concluded. “The question is not if, but when, and whether anyone is prepared to stand with the Iranian people when it does.” According to IranWire, the situation in Iran continues to evolve amid these mounting pressures.