Trump’s second inaugural address: Immigration, culture, and conflict

Previewing Donald Trump’s second inaugural address, several of his political advisors suggested that its tone would be gentler and its substance more unifying than was his “American Carnage” inaugural address eight years ago. They must have been misinformed as his spoken words continued to emphasize American crisis and decline and were hardly unifying or uplifting.

While there were occasional rhetorical bows toward unity, the thrust of the speech was an all-out assault on illegal immigration and on aspects of American culture loathed by social conservatives (with scant attention to any plans to bring down the cost of living, one of the issues that elected him). He wants to be a peacemaker overseas but a warrior at home. And in a speech traditionally devoted to selfless themes, President Trump spoke about the extent of his electoral victory and professed his belief that he had been saved by God to save the nation.

The speech celebrated the broadening of the Republican coalition that Trump has achieved. He praised Martin Luther King and promised that “we will strive to make his dream a reality.” To the Black and Hispanic communities, he said, “I want to thank you, we set records [measured in votes] and I will not forget it.” Absent, however, was a nod to President Biden, Vice President Harris, or any of his predecessors—or an olive branch to the 48.4% of Americans who voted for Harris.

Surprisingly, President Trump had little to say about his economic plans or efforts to tackle inflation, preferring instead to spend much of his time on the “invasion” of illegal immigrants into this country. Indeed, this was the portion of the address that was most detailed and concrete. To counter this “invasion,” Trump promised to declare a national emergency at the southern border, reinstate the remain in Mexico policy, end the practice of catch and release, send troops to the southern border, and designate cartels as foreign terrorist organizations.

In addition to the war at the southern border Trump, promised to wage a culture war, which he termed a “revolution of common sense.” Under his administration, the United States government would only recognize two genders, male and female, eliminate diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) programs in the government (especially in the military), and “end the practice of trying to engineer race and gender into every aspect of public life.”

Trump promised a golden age with no new overseas wars. He did not mention Russia or the war in Ukraine, but he did note his plan to expand our nation, including “increas[ing] our territory” and “[planting] the Stars and Stripes on the planet Mars.” (Elon Musk smiled broadly at this phrase.) He declared that “We didn’t give the Panama Canal to China, we gave it to Panama, and we’re taking it back.” He did not say how he would do this without starting a new war.

The newly inaugurated president used the occasion to announce two name changes. The Gulf of Mexico will henceforth be called “the Gulf of America,” and Mount Denali will revert to its name before the Obama administration—Mount McKinley. Indeed, William McKinley (who was a big fan of tariffs) seems to have replaced Andrew Jackson as Trump’s favorite president. What this portends for the fate of economic populism in the new administration is anyone’s guess. But it cannot be an accident that Trump chose to resuscitate the phrase “manifest destiny.” We will find out whether our destiny includes control of Greenland and Canada, as he has suggested.

Along with his unscripted speech later in the afternoon that talked about the stolen 2020 election and his grievances against political opponents, Trump’s second inaugural address is consistent with his campaign, in which he worked tirelessly to intensify his support rather than broaden it. If he wishes to maintain majority support, however, he must recognize that the voters who put him over the top were not fervent MAGA supporters but rather swing voters who decided that he offered a better chance than his opponent of solving specific problems, high prices for the basics of daily life first among them. If he governs as a hardliner on immigration and cultural issues, he may solidify his loyal base, but if he fails to take down high prices or restore economic hopes of upward mobility, he risks losing swing voters while reenergizing his disheartened opponents. In an era of narrow and shifting majorities, this is a risk that he ignores at his peril.

The End Of Trump?

Donald Trump has had a bad month, probably the worst of his political career. His hand-picked Senate candidates lost winnable races in New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Arizona, torpedoing Republicans’ chances of retaking the Senate. The same thing happened to the gubernatorial candidates he endorsed in Pennsylvania and Arizona. Meanwhile, Republican governors who kept their distance from him or criticized him publicly won landslide reelection victories in New Hampshire, Ohio, and Georgia.

Mr. Trump’s legal difficulties are compounding as well. On November 6, a New York court convicted the Trump Organization on 17 criminal charges of tax fraud and related offenses. Mr. Trump is facing numerous other state and federal investigations, and the January 6 committee may well include him in the criminal referrals it will send to the Justice Department before the end of December.

Picture : The New Yorker

Mr. Trump’s conduct since announcing his candidacy for the 2024 Republican nomination has weakened his credibility within his party. His decision to have dinner at Mar-a-Lago with a notorious Holocaust denier along with the anti-Semitic artist and Hitler admirer formerly known as Kanye West, led to a chorus of criticism from Republican elected officials and even his closest Jewish friends and supporters. His tweet calling for the suspension of the U.S. Constitution to reverse or redo the 2020 presidential election sent many of his long-time boosters running for the tall grass.

Against this backdrop, signs are multiplying that Mr. Trump’s party no longer sees him as the path to victory in 2024. A Marist poll conducted in mid-November found that only 35% of Republicans think he would be their strongest candidate, while 54% said “someone else.” A recently released Marquette University survey showed Joe Biden tied with Ron DeSantis in a potential matchup but leading Donald Trump by 10 points, 44% to 34%. Among the Republicans in this poll, Trump’s negatives were three times as high as DeSantis’s. Just 32% of the electorate has a favorable opinion of Trump; among Independents, just 22%.

Most Republican analysts believe that anti-Trump sentiment within their party has expanded significantly, in part because the former president’s recent conduct has been outrageous by even his standards, but largely because Trump is increasingly seen as a loser—and rightly so. In 2018, he led his party to a 42-seat loss in the House of Representatives. Two years later, he lost his reelection bid to Joe Biden by more than 7 million popular votes and by 74 votes in the Electoral College as five states he won in 2016 shifted into the Democratic column. Two months later, his ham-handed intervention in two Georgia senatorial runoffs gave Democrats control of the Senate. Against this backdrop, Republicans are increasingly viewing this year’s midterm election results as the continuation of a long trend that they need to disrupt.

Does all this mean that Trump is finished? Not quite, because he still has a narrow path to victory in 2024. He would probably lose a head-to-head contest with Ron DeSantis for the Republican nomination, but many other ambitious Republicans are lining up to join the race. Unless the contest narrows quickly, we could see a repetition of 2016, when the division of the anti-Trump vote among multiple candidates allowed Trump to rack up an insurmountable string of victories with only a plurality of the vote.

If Donald Trump becomes the Republican nominee, it is not hard to imagine circumstances in which he could defeat Joe Biden. For example, assume that inflation proves even more stubborn than the Federal Reserve chair Jerome Powell now believes and that the Fed is forced to keep raising interest rates well into 2023, triggering a recession that continues into 2024.

Granted, voters do not live by bread alone, as the recent midterm elections prove. But it would be dubious to assume that a recession following hard on the heels of the highest inflation in four decades would not have a significant impact on voter sentiment. Mr. Trump’s path back to the Oval Office has gotten narrower and steeper in recent months, but it is not yet completely blocked. (Brookings)

Have Democrats Become A Party Of The Left?

The current condition of the Democratic Party presents an apparent paradox. On the one hand, the party’s ideological composition has shifted to the left. In the quarter century since Bill Clinton’s first term, moderates’ share of the party has fallen from a plurality of 48% to just 35% while liberals’ share has doubled from 25% to 51%. 2020 was the first time ever that liberals constituted an outright majority of the party.

On the other hand, moderates contributed more votes to Joe Biden’s victory than did liberals, as has been the case for winning Democratic presidential candidates for decades. The difference between these two measures is easily explained. Despite expanding by 6 percentage points since Jimmy Carter’s defeat in 1980, self-identified liberals still constitute the smallest portion of the electorate, as has been the case for four decades—as the following table indicates.

While most liberals are Democrats, many moderates are either Republicans or Independents. (In 2020, nearly half of Independents described themselves as moderate, compared to just 20% who think of themselves as liberal.) Biden did slightly better among liberals and Democrats in 2020 than Hillary Clinton did in 2016, but he did much better than she did among moderates and Independents. He increased the Democrats’ share of the moderate vote from 52 to 64%, expanding their margin from 12 percentage points to 30 points. And he increased Democrats’ share of Independents from 42 to 54%, turning a 4-point loss in 2016 into a 13-point advantage in 2020.

Thus, at the national level, a winning Democratic coalition relies on legions of voters who are neither Democrats nor liberals. Successful Democratic presidential candidates must win strong—not narrow—majorities of moderate voters, and they must at least keep it close among Independents. Table 2 shows the electoral coalitions of recent Democratic presidents. Note that all of them rely on votes from moderates.[1]

Democratic primary voters seem to recognize this reality. The last time Democrats nominated the contender who stood farthest to the left was in 1972, and the results of the general election did not encourage them to repeat this experiment. Despite the party’s steady shift to the left over the past quarter century, Democrats have been forced to take electoral reality into account when they select their presidential nominee. One might think that Democrats’ incentives would be very different in subnational jurisdictions where they enjoy strong majorities. But as the recent mayoral primary in New York City shows, this is not necessarily so.

Despite the fact that Rudy Giuliani led New York City for two mayoral terms, followed by Mike Bloomberg for three terms, many observers persist in viewing New York City as the most liberal big city in America, with the possible exception of San Francisco. It came as a surprise to them that in the recent mayoral race, the winner and the strong second place finisher were not the most left-wing candidates. The winner, Eric Adams, ran as a law-and-order centrist and establishment politician; the second-place finisher, Kathryn Garcia, ran on her experience in city government. Left-wing voters coalesced around Maya Wiley, who won the endorsement of Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Ortiz. Wiley came in third, and Andrew Yang, another moderate candidate who allied himself with Garcia in the campaign’s closing weeks, finished fourth.

Whether one looks at the first-round results or the dynamics of the ranked-choice voting process that the city used, the overall picture remains the same. If political opinions were evidence-based, the NYC results would make it a little harder for Fox News and their viewers to argue that Democrats are a party of socialists who want to let crime run amok, give away your money, and teach your children that all whites are racists.

Let’s look more closely at the results of this revealing primary contest.

On the initial ranked-choice ballot, the centrist candidate, Eric Adams, racked up a substantial first ballot lead over the second-place finisher, Maya Wiley, heiress to the Sanders/AOC wing of the Democratic party. Wiley came in only a few points above the third-place finisher, another centrist, Kathryn Garcia. As the field was winnowed in subsequent rounds, Garcia overtook Wiley for 2nd place, leaving a contest between two relatively moderate candidates, Garcia and Adams, in the final round.

Because this was the first mayor’s race conducted using ranked choice voting, there were no exit polls conducted, so scholars have had to go back to an old-fashioned way of understanding election results by making inferences based on geography. The results in the five boroughs of New York tell an interesting story. While Adams did not do well in upscale Manhattan, he won the less affluent African American sections of Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx. And he did so by specifically repudiating calls to “defund the police,” declaring at one point that was a conversation being pushed by “a lot of young white affluent people.”

Most minority communities, it turns out, want both more policing and better policing, and Adams hit this sweet spot with special credibility as a former reform-minded police officer. Like Biden before him, Adams seems to have understood that ideas fashionable on the activist left don’t always work for the voters who are most likely to be affected by rising crime rates.[2] Even in NYC, it turns out, Democrats need to balance the views of mostly white progressives with those of working-class voters, many of them racial and ethnic minorities, who focus on the conditions they experience every day in their communities and put concrete results ahead of ideological correctness. As Democrats look ahead to 2022 and 2024, when social and cultural issues will be hotly contested, this lesson should not be forgotten.

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