For decades, nuclear power plants have enjoyed protection from attacks even in wartime, as stipulated by the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions. This protocol mandates that nuclear facilities should not be targeted, even in pursuit of strategic military advantages. However, this long-held taboo was breached recently, setting a perilous precedent as Moscow and Kyiv disregard the sanctity of nuclear exclusion zones.
Last week, the situation at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant exemplified this dangerous shift. Reports emerged that Russian troops had set tire fires beneath one of the plant’s cooling towers in response to Ukraine’s incursion into its territory. This incident underscores President Vladimir Putin’s readiness to use nuclear threats as a means of provocation.
Legally, nuclear power plants are always classified as civilian infrastructure. Endangering these facilities can lead to widespread blackouts, compromise essential services like hospitals, and increase dependence on environmentally harmful fossil fuels. As tensions rise with a potential conflict between Israel and Iran, there is an urgent need to ensure that the Ukraine conflict does not set a precedent for endangering nuclear energy as a strategic pawn.
Calls have been made for new legal and political frameworks to safeguard nuclear power stations during wartime. However, there is concern that new legislation could weaken the existing Geneva Conventions and complicate legal adherence, potentially allowing rogue states to selectively follow regulations.
Historically, the protection of nuclear facilities was universally accepted as fundamental. The legal frameworks of major powers like Russia, Israel, and the United States acknowledge these facilities as protected zones. Yet, on March 4, 2022, when Russian forces attacked the Zaporizhzhia plant, they not only provoked international outrage but also violated their own national policies.
Following this, Russia assaulted the decommissioned Chernobyl nuclear plant and its sarcophagus. By March 9, Chernobyl had lost external power due to the fighting and had to rely on backup power sources. Although the site has since returned to Ukrainian control, Zaporizhzhia remains under Russian occupation.
What can be done to address this situation? Shutting down nuclear energy production entirely is neither realistic nor sensible. Presently, nuclear reactors supply 50 percent of Ukraine’s domestic energy, with four being of Russian design and located within Russian-occupied areas.
Nuclear power stations are designed to endure terrorist attacks and aircraft strikes, but they are not equipped for the repeated accidental strikes and environmental damages that can occur during prolonged conflicts. If Russia fails to maintain Zaporizhzhia properly, there is a significant risk that accidents or counterattacks could release hazardous isotopes such as Iodine, Caesium, and Strontium into both Russia and Ukraine.
Russia’s reckless behavior poses a threat to the safety and security of Eastern Europe. Putin’s actions against Ukraine’s nuclear energy infrastructure represent an unprecedented breach of international humanitarian law, a law that has traditionally been respected even among adversarial states. For instance, in 1988, India and Pakistan, despite their historical tensions, agreed to exclude nuclear installations from attack to prevent the catastrophic risks associated with targeting such facilities.
In response to the seizure of Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine has called for sanctions against Rosatom, the Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation. However, such measures could harm the broader European energy infrastructure. The European Union relies on Russian fuel for fourteen of its nuclear reactors, and the global nuclear industry is not yet equipped to address this shortfall.
The end of Europe’s reliance on Russian nuclear resources could send a strong message that exploiting nuclear power plants during warfare carries severe consequences. Nevertheless, sanctions are currently impractical without a viable alternative.
There is a glimmer of hope in the form of diversifying Europe’s nuclear fuel sources. Efforts are underway to develop nuclear fuel conversion, enrichment, and fabrication capabilities outside of Russia. This transition is already underway, with European power stations forging new long-term contracts with non-Russian suppliers. The shift away from Russian dependency is opening new economic opportunities in the sector, exemplified by collaborations between companies like Westinghouse and Enusa to produce fuel for Russian-designed reactors, effectively reducing Moscow’s influence.
Ultimately, Europe’s move away from Russian nuclear resources should signal that exploiting nuclear facilities during conflicts will have significant repercussions. It is imperative for the international community to act decisively and restore the long-standing safeguards around nuclear energy infrastructure in conflict zones. Both Moscow and Kyiv must cease their attacks that endanger nuclear infrastructure and commit to upholding the principles that have historically prevented disaster.
